This paper proposes a normative taxonomy by which universities can express the extent to which they meet five core epistemic responsibilities. Epistemic responsibilities are responsibilities that have to do with the attainment of knowledge and understanding. The core epistemic responsibilities, which we call the Big Five, are to (1) foster research integrity, (2) teach for intellectual virtue, (3) address the big questions of life, (4) give humanistic inquiry and education a proper place, and (5) serve society. The paper characterizes the Big Five in some detail and explains why they are core epistemic responsibilities of universities. The paper concludes by describing the steps that should be taken in order to test, amend, and implement the taxonomy. This is an interesting manuscript which is somewhat outside my field of expertise, which is centred around molecular biology and genetics. There is no doubt that this will have limited my ability to provide a detailed critique of the arguments presented, and this may also limit the value of some of my suggestions. Nonetheless I advance these in the hope that my comments will indicate how this article was received by someone outside the field, given that this paper will interest a broad range of academics and researchers.
Introduction
In this paper, we propose a normative taxonomy of what we call the 'Big Five' in academia: five core epistemic responsibilities of universities. Epistemic responsibilities are responsibilities that have to do with the attainment of knowledge, understanding, insight, rationality, and explanation. Thus, they are to be distinguished from moral responsibilities -that concern the wellbeing of humans and animals -and practical responsibilities, such as the responsibility to develop societally useful technologies and effective medical interventions 1 . For each epistemic responsibility, we distinguish five levels describing the extent to which a university meets that responsibility or strives to do so. Our taxonomy is meant as a tool to assess the degree to which a university meets its core epistemic responsibilities. The format we use is inspired by the Transparency and Openness Promotion (TOP) guidelines 2 that journals can use to describe the extent to which they meet the goals of Open Science.
The taxonomy proposed here is a product of two research projects funded by the Templeton World Charity Foundation: Science beyond Scientism (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) and The Epistemic Responsibilities of the University (2016-2019) 3 . The first project explored which questions science can and which ones it cannot address, as well as whether the natural sciences are the only reliable source of knowledge. The second project explored what the core epistemic responsibilities of universities are, given various contemporary challenges, such as hypercompetition, publication pressure, the marginalization of the humanities, and the commercialization of the university. In both projects, philosophers worked in close cooperation with biomedical and social scientists. We present this as work in progress, as a starting point for gaining experience with using the taxonomy and consensus building for a more mature version. This paper is structured as follows. First, we provide the taxonomy by specifying academia's Big Five epistemic responsibilities and detailing five levels of meeting them ( Table 1) . After that, we argue that these are indeed five core epistemic responsibilities of universities (section 2). Finally, we lay out which future steps we aim to take to test, amend, and implement the taxonomy (section 3).
A normative taxonomy
Our proposal distinguishes five epistemic responsibilities. We consider each to be of equal importance, so the order in which we present them is not hierarchical. The attainment levels I through V for each responsibility, however, are meant hierarchically: each level presents a more advanced stage of meeting the responsibility at issue.
We think of these responsibilities as attaching primarily to entire universities. So, in order to meet them, each responsibility should have systematic consequences, throughout the university and its faculties, departments, institutes, or other organizational parts. If a university strives to teach for intellectual virtue at the highest level, for example, students throughout the university should be instructed in what these virtues are and stimulated to cultivate them through virtue-building teaching activities.
This doesn't mean that there cannot be an internal division of labour when it comes to meeting epistemic responsibilities: giving humanistic inquiry a proper place will primarily fall on humanities departments, although humanities scholars will teach in other departments and collaborate with scientists in other departments as well when a university strives for level V of this responsibility. Similarly, not all departments and research teams will have to serve society in the same way or to an equal degree. There will be significant differences between, say, the theoretical physicists and the nutrition scientists.
We will now clarify each responsibility briefly and motivate why it belongs on the list of epistemic responsibilities of universities.
To foster research integrity.
Research integrity is fostered by getting rid of perverse incentives, stimulating good mentoring, having an open research climate, and so on. Detrimental research practices include both rare major research misbehaviours like fabrication of data and highly prevalent minor misbehaviours like selective reporting 4 . By 'responsible conduct of research' we mean behavior that meets the principles and standards for good research, as laid out in major codes of conduct for research integrity 5 . Such behavior can be stimulated at the level of individual scholars, but also that of groups, such as research teams or departments. Ideally, research integrity is promoted for both individuals and groups.
The results of scientific and scholarly research play a crucial role in modern society. Universities carry out a substantial part of this research and educate and train researchers who perform the studies and apply the results. To ensure the validity and trustworthiness of findings research needs to be performed according to the principles and standards for research integrity. In recent years it has become painfully evident that there is substantial room for improvement in the level of compliance to these principles and standards 6 . Surveys indicate that 2% of researchers admit to having fabricated or falsified data themselves, while one third says that they have been engaged in less serious questionable research practices 7 . Only 10 -40% of study results turn out to be reproducible when the study is repeated 8 . This is due to small sample sizes, selective reporting and other questionable research practices. Although these phenomena are understudied, it is clear that more transparency 9 and specifically preregistration 10 of study protocols and data analysis plans will lead to considerable improvements. This epistemic responsibility entails not only the adoption of transparency and educating staff and students in responsible conduct of research, but also removing perverse incentives from the ways in which researchers are assessed 11 and performing research on research to strengthen the evidence base for optimizing research integrity. pone.0005738 Note that these numbers concern scientists' selfreporting; they go up considerably when researchers are asked whether they're aware of colleagues having committed scientific fraud or engaged in questionable research practices. 8 God's perfection and omnipotence led Galileo to assume that mathematics is our best guide to understanding the orbits of the planets and hence that heliocentrism rather than geocentrism is correct 16 . Darwin asked whether humans are unique or whether all life on earth is monogenetic, which led him to develop evolutionary theory 17 . Einstein opposed the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics on metaphysical grounds, as he didn't believe the universe could be fundamentally probabilistic 18 . For these reasons universities cannot and should not operate as if the big questions don't exist or cannot be taken seriously. Rather, they should take them seriously and mobilize their intelligence as well as state of the art science and scholarship to address these questions in an intellectually responsible way.
To teach for intellectual

To give humanistic inquiry and education a proper place.
Universities ought to have room for the full range of academic disciplines, in both the sciences and the humanities. Many of today's most urgent challenges in society cannot be solved by purely scientific or technological means; successful solutions require compelling communication, consideration of moral values and norms, and in-depth understanding of cultures and religions. All of these things, and much more, are studied in the humanities. Hence, universities ought to facilitate and embrace humanistic inquiry and teaching, and stimulate interdisciplinary collaborations between scientists and humanities scholars. Of course, some universities -technological universities, for instance -do not include humanities departments. For them, this responsibility may be either left aside, or be interpreted as follows: the responsibility to give due weight to knowledge and understanding produced by humanities departments in other universities.
Giving the humanities a proper place is a responsibility of the university for one basic reason: the humanities can deliver truth, knowledge and insight in areas where the sciences cannot 19 . The humanities have their own objects of study: they study objects that have "meaning" in a special sense, viz. meaning that derives from human conventions, from human intentions, and/or from human purposive behaviour 20 . The knowledge and understanding the humanities provide differs from the knowledge and understanding that the sciences offer, in that the former is often 'indexical' (that is, related to human interests and concerns), 'perspectival' (it specifies how things look from, say, a romantic perspective), and value-related (that is, related to social, political, moral, aesthetic, or religious values) 21 . In addition to this, the humanities are particularly suitable for educating students to become well-informed, critical citizens who can reflect on socially urgent questions about life, health, education, justice, equality, liberty, etc. and participate fully in society and politics 22 .
To serve society.
Universities can serve society at a number of levels: local (a city or region), national, or international, humanity worldwide. What we have in mind here is serving society epistemically, that is, to help society acquire true belief, knowledge, and understanding about important issues. So, what we have in mind are such things as press releases, expert advice, popular articles, opinion pieces, public lectures, interviews, and so on. Of course, universities sometimes also serve society in a more practical manner, e.g., by way of proposing effective policies, producing medical interventions and other technologies. Such practical interventions are often based on scientific evidence, so the epistemic and the practical are not entirely separate, but they can be distinguished for analytical purposes. We focus on the former here, as our taxonomy concerns the epistemic rather than the moral, practical, or social responsibilities of universities. This is a responsibility for at least two reasons. First, many scientific and scholarly discoveries are so complex that if academics do not disseminate their knowledge, those discoveries will remain unknown among the larger audience. Second, it often requires extensive academic knowledge to understand the importance and ramifications of various discoveries. Knowledge and understanding are of intrinsic epistemic value. If the university does not serve society by sharing academic knowledge and understanding, then, for much academic knowledge and understanding, that value will be attained only by a very small group of academics in the relevant field. If the university takes its epistemic responsibility of knowledge dissemination seriously, then much larger groups -academics in other fields, society as a whole -will attain those epistemic values.
Future steps
As indicated, we propose our normative taxonomy as a tool to assess the degree to which a university meets the Big Five epistemic responsibilities. Our proposal is a first attempt; in future work we aim to validate, test, amend, and implement the taxonomy. We envision doing this in four consecutive steps.
First, we want to fine-tune our taxonomy in a Delphi Study 23, 24 with international experts that aims in its first round at adding, replacing, and reformulating various epistemic responsibilities. The second and third Delphi rounds will seek consensus on the corresponding levels of meeting the responsibility at issue and explore what the best practices are for reaching higher levels of specific responsibilities.
Next, we will organize co-creation workshops 25 with representatives of relevant stakeholders in order to discuss a penultimate version of the taxonomy. The focus of the workshop will be on the operationalization of the levels of meeting the different epistemic responsibilities in a way which makes application of the taxonomy feasible, transparent, and as objective as possible.
Then, we will test and qualitatively evaluate the taxonomy in a number of universities, resulting in a definitive description of the responsibilities, the levels, and a toolkit of best practices.
Finally, we will publish and disseminate the results on a dedicated website and explore whether the taxonomy is a suitable alternative for, or addition to, the currently dominant Academic Ranking of World Universities 26 and the Times Higher Education World University Rankings 27 .
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My main comments pertain to the taxonomy proposed in Table 1 . I would not argue with the five epistemic responsibilities put forward; however, I did wonder whether five levels of taxonomy are required for any or all of the five proposed responsibilities. Some of the descriptions provided for levels I and II seem unlikely to occur in practice, and I could not always see clear distinctions between some levels proposed, most frequently for levels I and II.
For example, for "1. To foster research integrity", I could not see a clear difference between "Issues of detrimental research practices and responsible conduct of research are neglected" (level I) and "Issues…. are occasionally addressed" (level II). There may not be much difference in practice between something being "neglected" or "occasionally addressed", and it is also not clear how "occasionally" would be reliably measured. Similarly, I could not see a clear difference between level III "Detrimental research practices are addressed… but there is no academic climate that actively stimulates responsible conduct of research" and level IV "There is an academic climate that detects and acts upon detrimental research practices and actively stimulates responsible conduct of research, but only at the level of individual researchers".
For "2. To teach for intellectual virtue", I couldn't see clear differences between level I "the university…. pays no attention to intellectual virtues" and level II "intellectual virtues are considered important, but not taught". I also could not imagine any University that would fall into either of these categories.
Again, I couldn't see clear differences for the proposed levels I and II for "3. To address the big questions of life", ie these questions being "neglected" (level I), versus "mentioned but discarded" (level II). 1.
2.
For "4. To give humanistic inquiry and education a proper place", I also saw no real distinction between the humanities being "marginalized" (level I) and "not marginalized but considered and treated as being inferior" (level II). Levels III, IV, and V commonly refer to humanities being given a "proper place" in the university, but this definition will naturally vary between universities according to their type, i.e. technical universities versus universities with a strong and stated focus upon the humanities. Some wording within levels III-V also lacked definition, i.e. "in isolation" (level III), "some other disciplines" (level IV), and "across disciplines" (level V). "Disciplines" can be defined quite narrowly by some universities, so working with other disciplines or across disciplines does not always imply working between the humanities and the sciences.
Finally, for "5. To serve society", universities where "research and teaching are confined to …purely academic challenges" (level I) could argue that they are serving society in this way, possibly by pursuing academic challenges that can indirectly linked to the big questions of life. It also seems unlikely that any university would be defined by level II "Research and teaching identify societal challenges, but the university leaves it to others to confer knowledge … relevant to those challenges".
Are all factual statements correct and adequately supported by citations?
Contemporary challenges such as hypercompetition, publication pressures, marginalisation of the humanities and commercialization of universities (page 3, paragraph 2) should be supported by references.
The status of reference 1 (footnote 1) which is a manuscript by Peels et al, could be updated (page 3).
Are arguments sufficiently supported by evidence from the published literature?
Although the manuscript states that "more transparency and specifically pre-registration of study protocols and data analysis plans will lead to considerable improvements (in the use of small sample sizes, selective reporting and other questionable research practices, from the preceding sentence), this seems to be somewhat of an overstatement. Firstly, more transparency and pre-registration may not impact on the use of small sample sizes, as these might represent feasibility constraints that pre-registration may not overcome. Secondly, I understand that there is not yet a substantial body of literature that describes the possible benefits and/or drawbacks of study pre-registration, by comparing the results and outcomes of pre-registered studies versus comparable studies that lacked pre-registration.
Finally, the manuscript states that (the big questions of life) "are too important to be left entirely to non-academics". This statement could be written in a more inclusive way, for example by indicating that as these questions are so important, they are everyone's concern, including the concern of academics.
Is the topic of the opinion article discussed accurately in the context of the current literature? Partly
Are all factual statements correct and adequately supported by citations? Partly
Partly
This article proposes what Peels call a "normative taxonomy" of the "Big Five" epistemic et al. responsibilities universities ought to meet: (1) fostering research integrity, (2) teaching (for) intellectual virtues, (3) addressing the big questions, (4) valuing the humanities, and (5) serving society. This normative taxonomy essentially serves as an designed to assess the performance of analytical rubric universities. One could easily imagine -and in fact, Peels propose as much in §3 -refining the et al. rubric presented in Table 1 , using it to assess the performance of various universities, and then comparing their "Big Five" scores to their world university rankings. We agree that undertaking these tasks presents many enticing possibilities, especially to those of us inclined against bean counting approaches to accountability. Nevertheless, since they position themselves as aspiring university rankers, they should address the range of critiques targeting existing rankings, their methodologies, and the performativity of these rankings. They should then situate their own approach within that context, arguing especially that it is an improvement on -and escapes the criticisms levelled at -existing rankings. This is our global concern.
Below, we offer a number of other substantial concerns, followed by a shorter list of minor issues to consider:
Why these five? Peels propose five epistemic responsibilities of universities as Big Five. The authors point out et al.
the that they consider each of the Big Five equally important. They also defend each of the five as indeed responsibilities that universities ought to meet. However, they fail to argue that these five epistemic responsibilities are the most important epistemic responsibilities for universities, that these five are in fact equally important, that these five are sufficient to capture the epistemic responsibilities universities ought to meet, or that universities have no other equally worthy responsibilities that ought to be included.
1.
2.
3. a formative evaluation. We are simply suggesting that the authors consider using their analytic approach to complement a more holistic approach.
Who counts, and why do they count?
In §3, the authors suggest optimising their rubric by means of a Delphi Study "with international experts", which could lead to fine-tuning it, but possibly also to radical revisions. If the latter is the case, then what is the status of the current five epistemic responsibilities? When it comes to the actual Delphi study, whom they choose to participate in the study will likely make a very big difference to the final design of the rubric. Presumably, the authors focus on "experts" because they assume experts know more about epistemic responsibilities than non-experts do. Yet, the way in which the authors present it suggests a retreat to the deficit/diffusion model of public understanding of science. Not only has the deficit model been shown to be factually incorrect, it also presupposes a social contract for science and scholarship that imagines universities as ivory towers. In their discussion of a university's responsibility to serve society epistemically, the authors focus on the supply side of knowledge production, suggesting that knowledge dissemination is how best to serve society. Arguably, however, serving society -even if we limit this to an epistemic responsibility -means something other than telling society what we academics think they need to know. Here again, the separation between epistemic and other responsibilities creates a lot of friction, since a departure from the deficit model requires a high degree of interaction and participation beyond universities. In fact, one could argue that interaction and participation are epistemic requirements (co production of knowledge).
Along these lines, we suggest that non-experts may have valuable feedback to offer, even if the authors ultimately decide only to pursue the development of an analytic rubric for epistemic responsibilities of universities. One way to include the demand side of knowledge production in the design of their rubric would be to recruit non-expert stakeholders to participate in the proposed Delphi Study and workshops or organise parallel expert (Delphi) and citizen (Citizen Summit) consultations.
We also have a few more minor points that nevertheless warrant attention:
Despite the argument that the rubric is to be applied to entire universities, the responsibilities focus very much on individuals and groups (which seem to be multiple individuals in the ways in which they are discussed) and less on the level of structures and collectives.
Peels frame irreproducibility solely as the result of sub-par science and thus as a research et al. integrity issue. Their previous work, as well current scholarly debates on the characters and qualities or irreproducibiluty and irreplicability, takes up a much more nuanced position. Perhaps the authors will consider adding some of that nuance here.
Excusing a few universities (technical universities or polytechnics, in this case) of taking responsibility for one of the epistemic responsibilities (#4) suggests that giving humanistic inquiry and education a proper place is optional. This seems to conflict with the idea that all responsibilities are equally important. It also opens up possibilities for policies that deprioritise humanities research and teaching (cf. the current report in NL).
Van Rijn
Partly
Are all factual statements correct and adequately supported by citations? Yes
Are arguments sufficiently supported by evidence from the published literature? Partly
Are the conclusions drawn balanced and justified on the basis of the presented arguments? Yes
The reviewers are currently engaged in an ongoing debate with the authors of the Competing Interests: paper on whether the humanities need a replication drive like that currently ongoing for the sciences. Since the reviewers take the negative side of that debate -we do not think the humanities need a replication drive -and the authors defend the affirmative side, someone might believe we are incapable of offering a fair review. The debate is cordial, however, and one of the authors (Peels) has been included as a presenter in a session conference session on the topic organized by the reviewers. We expect that (fruitful) debate to continue, although it is possible that we could reach consensus on the matter. Although we offer a critical review here, we do so in the spirit of helping the authors strengthen their arguments and not from any ill will.
We confirm that we have read this submission and believe that we have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard, however we have significant reservations, as outlined above.
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